Tag: NATO

By Elsa Barron

On July 11th and 12th, the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), with support from the U.S. Mission to NATO, will bring a delegation of six young leaders to the NATO Public Forum 2023, accompanied by the Center for Climate and Security’s Elsa Barron and IMCCS Secretary General, Sherri Goodman. Pau Alvarez Aragones (Spain), Diana Garlytska (Ukraine/ Lithuania), Marieke Jacobs (Netherlands), Michelle Ramirez (United States), George Tavridis (Greece), and Ytze de Vries (Netherlands) will be in attendance. They represent a group of twelve young leaders who were selected for the IMCCS young leaders network based on their video messages on the theme “Climate Security in My Backyard.”

In an April webinar and workshop, the group was joined by the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith, who shared that young people’s unprecedented mobilization on the issue of climate change illustrates their underlying power to move mountains, or transform seemingly entrenched systems to create positive change. With this as inspiration, the group cultivated innovative ideas based on their experiences with climate security risks at home, as well as potential solutions to this transnational challenge, which they will bring with them to Vilnius.

Climate Security Risks

Workshop participants identified the direct risks of extreme weather, water scarcity, food insecurity (including in marine environments), permafrost thaw, and wildfire on the health and stability of their regions. Without clear and transparent plans to curtail climate change and address these increasingly extreme conditions, participants argued that it is challenging for their generation to feel secure, even in their own homes. 

The group also discussed the compound impacts of increasing temperatures and ecological change, which place additional strains on security. In conditions such as drought and permafrost thaw described above, more communities are facing the painstaking decision to leave home. These decisions can be extremely dangerous, exemplified by casualties along the sea crossing to countries in the northern Mediterranean. Climate change hazards also affect the security of healthcare systems already impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, unhealthy air due to wildfire smoke is now a regular summer occurrence in Alaska, making the environment unsafe and straining the healthcare system. 

Finally, the group identified important security risks connected to the response to climate change, particularly related to research and technology. Understanding and addressing climate change in the Arctic has become more complex since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent breakdown of scientific and policy cooperation. Participants also discussed new resource dependencies and unequal access to technology in the midst of the energy transition, which could result in additional internal and international tensions. For example, one participant expressed concerns about increasing political tensions in the Netherlands as farmers protest the perceived effect of emissions cuts on livelihoods rooted in agriculture. 

These climate security risks identified by young leader participants provide insight into why NATO allied citizens rank climate change or extreme weather as one of their top three concerns, even ahead of war, terrorism, and political instability. The NATO Summit and Public Forum in Vilnius should ignite renewed urgency to address these challenges.

Climate Security Solutions

In order to address these challenges, participants brainstormed solutions for NATO policymakers and NATO member states. These solutions included transparent and inclusive governance and adaptation and resilience building. 

Communities affected by climate change want to know what their leaders are doing to address the challenges they face and want decision-makers to listen to their priorities. Arctic representatives emphasized the importance of consultation with local residents (including those in isolated or remote areas) on Arctic climate and security issues. The new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Canada provides one opportunity to expand NATO’s engagement in the Arctic and beyond, and could offer young leaders a seat at the table to help shape NATO’s climate security priorities. Transparency among NATO members and partners on climate security practice is common sense as nations address novel transboundary climate challenges. So is engagement with young allied citizens on issues that concern their future security. 

Participants also expressed a desire to see more foresight and preparation devoted to climate adaptation, particularly related to disaster risk reduction and recovery. Disaster response is a point of connectivity for NATO member states. One participant noted that Albania relies on air support from Greece to combat wildfires and multiple countries in the region have received support from NATO allies to fight fires. To help secure their future, young leaders want to see more forward planning and transparency on how NATO will respond to disasters in its member states as the frequency and intensity of these events increases. Within this conversation, participants particularly emphasized the importance of building resilience for everyone according to a justice framework – including those who may be geographically isolated or politically marginalized. 

The IMCCS young leaders delegation will bring these ideas and more to the 2023 NATO Public Forum in Vilnius. NATO has expanded its efforts to engage the next generation of thinkers and changemakers through efforts such as the NATO 2030 Young Leaders program, and they must continue to do so. In Vilnius, they have the opportunity to gain young leaders’ insights and bolster the alliance’s commitment to inclusive peace and security in a climate-changed world. 

For more information about this project:

Watch the webinar “Climate Security in NATO’s Backyard.”

Watch the project featured onstage at the 2023 NATO Youth Summit.

Visit the project homepage. 

By Emil Havstrup and Akash Ramnath

This article was originally published by the Planetary Security Initiative.

Earlier this year, NATO announced it will set up a new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), spearheaded by Global Affairs Canada (Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Department of National Defence (Canadian Ministry of Defence), to be based in Montreal. The COE is linked to NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which is unique, not only in its designation of the Russian Federation as an adversary of NATO, but also in identifying non-traditional threats such as climate change, to the security of the alliance. It also builds upon a Climate Change and Security Action Plan that NATO adopted in 2021. 

This could pave the way for a shift in how the alliance engages with climate change. The security dimension of climate change in NATO’s threat environment, operational capabilities, as well as its own contributions to the decarbonisation efforts, are properly acknowledged. This article will discuss what role CCASCOE can play to further NATO’s goals of awareness raising, adapting to developing climate-induced security risks and preparing militaries for a new climate reality.

The aims and focus of CCASCOE

According to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, “climate change is a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security.” To support this, NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan focuses on four approaches to meet climate-security challenges:

1. Increased awareness of the impact of climate change on security;
2. Adaptation of the military to climate change;
3. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions of the military;
4. Enhancing NATO’s outreach on this issue.

CCASCOE is expected to cover these issues, but details on its exact focus and prioritisation are still to be confirmed. However, it can be inferred that it will closely mirror NATO’s priorities on the climate and security nexus. Key to CCASCOE’s success will be its ability to leverage existing expertise from think tanks and academia, best practices from member and partner countries, as well as raising awareness and mainstreaming climate-security through key political and military command levels. Another question will be how to cooperate with other centres and training institutes, notably the NATO Centre for Excellence for Energy Security (ENSEC).

Raising Awareness

Whilst climate-security has gained traction in recent years, there is undoubtedly still apprehension within military circles to adding additional agendas to military strategy and operations, notably with regard to a focus on decarbonisation, which in their minds could possibly undermine operational effectiveness.

This fear often understates the benefits that can come with adapting and mitigating armed forces to the impacts of climate change. So-called ‘Greener’ armed forces could in fact strengthen military capabilities by both improving strategic autonomy, lowering emissions contributions and promoting the development of new technologies which might have civilian applications. CCASCOE’s role would be raising this issue with the highest political and military leaderships levels to help, at the very least, accelerate the appetite in military ranks for this issue.

CCASCOE’s position within the NATO informational framework means that it can act as a hub for raising awareness, to the benefit of climate-proofing defence policies, military doctrines and related issues such as capabilities. In addition to risk assessments (discussed below), CCASCOE could disseminate learnings and promote the vast array of climate-security analyses already in circulation. These include work done by the International Military Council on Climate and Security, SIPRI’s Climate change and Security project, the German-spearhead Weathering Risks project, International Crisis Group and the UK-financed DCAF programme amongst others.

Finally, to continue the mainstreaming process, CCASCOE could also act as a central repository for climate-security best practices adopted by military operations around the world. Whether learning how to set up a Drought Operations Coordination centre from UN peacekeeping operations to electrifying aviation to support a military energy transition, pooling and disseminating best practices is a very effective way CCASCOE can further mainstreaming the climate agenda. An example of climate-security best practices sharing is the Planetary Security Initiative, hosted by the Clingendael Institute.

Adapting allied militaries

Climate change can pose threats to NATO’s operational ability by increasing the risks to infrastructure and environmental impacts on personnel, in addition to making NATO member militaries more responsible for dealing with humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction (HADR). Earlier research by Clingendael has identified the following aspects as particularly vulnerable:

1. Military infrastructure and installations;
2. Mental and physical health;
3. Equipment;
4. Air conditioning for personnel, computer and technology;
5. Fighter jet engine performance
6. Clothing

The key to supporting these adaptation efforts, will be in compiling and distributing existing knowledge on how to adapt military installations to more hazardous climate such as increased flooding, or how to ensure the health of troops in environments That experiences reoccurring heatwaves. CCASCOE could carry out research on the vulnerabilities NATO faces, and potential responses. Such research might also be conducted in collaboration with the COE for Military Medicine (MILMED), establishing a pathway of coordination with other COEs is vital to avoid duplication and to enhance synergies.

Such adjustments will depend upon risk assessments that can advise on these changing operational environments. As of 2021-22, NATO has begun to carry out a yearly Climate Change and Security Impact Assessments (CCSIA), which analyses environmental vulnerabilities of NATO assets.

Yet this framework does not provide overall assessments pertaining to the specific and nuanced risks each NATO installation faces. CCASCOE could help bridge this gap by analysing and aggregating the overall risks to each member state’s installations, thus enhancing the efficacy of such assessments. To achieve this, expertise in military risk assessments would need to be acquired, as well as closer feedback relationships with national militaries. An example of how a climate-influenced operational assessment could look like is offered by Deloitte.  

In addition, CCASCOE has the potential to shape NATO’s role in responding to climate change induced calls for HADR. With the growing prevalence of extreme weather phenomena like the forest fires in Europe this summer, current HADR architecture is stretched. Thus, militaries are more likely to become first responders in this respect.

With the additional strain placed on resourcing and operations, NATO has responded by creating a Centre of Excellence for Crisis Management and Disaster Response (CMDR). CCASCOE could empower this framework by supporting the integration of insights and best practices on how climate change affects HADR operations, to help improve upon existing international programs and mechanisms, in particular the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

Mitigation and Decarbonising defence

Within the NATO security apparatus, decarbonisation and the green transition of armed forces has often played second fiddle to emerging security developments. Momentum on projects such as the Green Defence Framework adopted in 2014, which sought to introduce green standards across NATO, faced setbacks due to the Russian invasion of Crimea. CCASCOE has the potential to galvanize NATO into placing greater focus on mitigation efforts despite the organisation lacking the ability to compel allied states to transition.

Utilising the idea of being a knowledge hub, CCASCOE could also help compile and disseminate best practices specifically on military decarbonisation and the energy transition. This might better identify synergies in strategy, R&D and implementation for decarbonisation.  By tackling so-called ‘low hanging fruit’, best practices that are already tried and tested would be easier to integrate into allied militaries. This includes pilot testing carbon transformation for military aviation or utilising microgrids to enhance installations energy resilience, a development championed by the US.

Investment in technology is an issue high on NATO’s agenda. The Defence Pledge endorsed in 2014 calls for allies to spend at least 20% of their military budget on Research and Development (R&D). Though most funds are earmarked for other projects, it is reasonable to assume that CCASCOE could play a major role in encouraging partner countries to dedicate further resources to R&D focused on green energy transition.

CCASCOE could complimentarily fill this void by determining common measurement denominators for reporting Scope 1 and 2 emissions. This would also be a helpful driver towards greater transparency in military emissions reporting, with NATO announcing it was developing a methodology to do so. Either CCASCOE should take the lead or work closely with NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO).

Moreover, CCASCOE could help innovation in relation to procurement procedures. Military purchases and procurements are strictly a competence of national governments. CCASCOE might leverage its potential as a knowledge hub to reflect best practices from other militaries on green procurement. This would also be a great help for the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), who are currently attempting to lead environmental mainstreaming of procurement amongst alliance members. National governments could potentially seek out CCASCOE on their own initiative to provide added perspective on spending and future areas of saving, as well as developing green procurement guidelines.

Taking advantage of central repositories like CCASCOE might have the added benefit of strengthening the diversity and specialisations of NATO armed forces. CCASCOE’s role would be to coordinate national militaries investments in different aspects of green defence and foster synergies, best utilising available resourcing and skills, whilst avoiding duplications.

A huge task ahead

Centres of Excellence and formalised best practice sharing channels are no guarantee of accelerating climate-sensitivities in militaries. However, CCASCOE can offer a central repository for strategic insights of how climate change impacts NATO’s capabilities and the ability of the alliance to respond to them. By being relatively high level on the strategy side, CCASCOE is unlikely to infringe on other, more implementation-orientated COEs, as well as further formalising NATO’s commitment to achieving net-zero by 2050.

In the coming months, the design of the COE will be further refined by Canada and fellow NATO Allies. It will be interesting to see which partners are brought in and what the focus will be of this ‘new kid’ on the climate-security block. Climate threats are only likely to grow, meaning NATO will need all the help it can get.