Young Leaders Hope for Action After the NATO Summit

By Elsa Barron and the IMCCS Young Leaders Network

Not long after leaders at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius identified climate change as a “defining challenge of our time,” the alliance was called upon to support one of its members facing climate disaster. On August 7th, NATO responded to extreme flooding in Slovenia, providing support that included helicopters, modular bridges, excavators, and engineering expertise from more than five alliance members. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on a phone call to Slovenia’s Prime Minister,

“The increasing frequency of extreme weather highlights the profound impact of climate change.” 

In light of climate change’s particularly profound impact on young people and increasing importance to NATO, the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), with support from the U.S. Mission to NATO, sent us – a delegation of young leaders – to the 2023 NATO Public Forum in Vilnius. Our group included Pau Alvarez Aragones (Spain), Diana Garlytska (Ukraine/ Lithuania), Marieke Jacobs (Netherlands), Michelle Ramirez (United States), George Tavridis (Greece), and Ytze de Vries (Netherlands), accompanied by the Center for Climate and Security’s Elsa Barron and IMCCS Secretary General Sherri Goodman. We entered the Public Forum with a set of climate security priorities identified by a larger young leaders network and left Vilnius with three revitalized recommendations for NATO, below.

First, continued youth engagement is critical, and requires a strategic approach. In the future, we see value in connecting multiple existing youth initiatives across the alliance to create a more diverse network in which young leaders can collaborate to confront and prevent climate change risks. Furthermore, we emphasize the eagerness of young people to take action on non-traditional threats and believe that it is possible to connect young people representing all NATO member states if the right support for such an initiative exists. To move beyond tokenization and toward substantive engagement, young people and other under-represented groups must be involved not only as recipients of knowledge and skills, but also as contributors to decision-making and action-taking.

Second, it is important to include tangible steps toward action in all conversations about climate security, including high-level dialogues. There are a diversity of solutions already being implemented on the “ground floor” of a climate-affected world. Examples provided by scientists, military personnel, or peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development actors could reinvigorate and inspire policy action. Furthermore, in taking action on climate change, collaboration with Indigenous Peoples is critical. Often some of the most impacted communities, Indigenous Peoples also have deep connections to the land and possess traditional knowledge about its stewardship passed down for generations. The recent acceptance of Finland and Sweden into NATO presents new opportunities for such engagement and the Arctic Council has set a useful model of inclusion of Indigenous Peoples through its six Permanent Participants. The alliance could include permanent seats for Indigenous representatives in high-level conversations on climate security in order to drive more ambitious and inclusive solutions for all.

Third, NATO headquarters and leaders should prioritize engagement with its member states aimed at deepening their action on climate mitigation and adaptation. A suite of documents released at the 2023 NATO Summit provides a launching pad for this needed work. The second edition of the NATO Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment further solidifies the evidence base for the prominence of climate security risks across multiple regions relevant to the alliance and the urgency to act now. A Compendium of Best Practices on climate security action within NATO member states provides a foundation for fruitful collaboration between allies in taking urgent action. The publication of the NATO Greenhouse Gases Emission Mapping and Analytical Methodology is the start of a roadmap for reducing NATO’s emissions to meet its 2050 net zero target, which will help prevent climate change risks from multiplying further. While this emissions target and methodology applies only to NATO as an institutional body and not the militaries of its member states, it represents an opportunity for NATO to provide both the pressure and resources required for its members to follow through on similar commitments. 

As young leaders experiencing climate disasters across our home countries and watching them accelerate at a concerning pace, we know that security is not possible without action on climate change. We urge our leaders to act with this priority top of mind and work to build a world worth our imagination. 

Young Leaders to Bring Climate Security Priorities to the NATO Public Forum

By Elsa Barron

On July 11th and 12th, the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), with support from the U.S. Mission to NATO, will bring a delegation of six young leaders to the NATO Public Forum 2023, accompanied by the Center for Climate and Security’s Elsa Barron and IMCCS Secretary General, Sherri Goodman. Pau Alvarez Aragones (Spain), Diana Garlytska (Ukraine/ Lithuania), Marieke Jacobs (Netherlands), Michelle Ramirez (United States), George Tavridis (Greece), and Ytze de Vries (Netherlands) will be in attendance. They represent a group of twelve young leaders who were selected for the IMCCS young leaders network based on their video messages on the theme “Climate Security in My Backyard.”

In an April webinar and workshop, the group was joined by the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith, who shared that young people’s unprecedented mobilization on the issue of climate change illustrates their underlying power to move mountains, or transform seemingly entrenched systems to create positive change. With this as inspiration, the group cultivated innovative ideas based on their experiences with climate security risks at home, as well as potential solutions to this transnational challenge, which they will bring with them to Vilnius.

Climate Security Risks

Workshop participants identified the direct risks of extreme weather, water scarcity, food insecurity (including in marine environments), permafrost thaw, and wildfire on the health and stability of their regions. Without clear and transparent plans to curtail climate change and address these increasingly extreme conditions, participants argued that it is challenging for their generation to feel secure, even in their own homes. 

The group also discussed the compound impacts of increasing temperatures and ecological change, which place additional strains on security. In conditions such as drought and permafrost thaw described above, more communities are facing the painstaking decision to leave home. These decisions can be extremely dangerous, exemplified by casualties along the sea crossing to countries in the northern Mediterranean. Climate change hazards also affect the security of healthcare systems already impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, unhealthy air due to wildfire smoke is now a regular summer occurrence in Alaska, making the environment unsafe and straining the healthcare system. 

Finally, the group identified important security risks connected to the response to climate change, particularly related to research and technology. Understanding and addressing climate change in the Arctic has become more complex since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent breakdown of scientific and policy cooperation. Participants also discussed new resource dependencies and unequal access to technology in the midst of the energy transition, which could result in additional internal and international tensions. For example, one participant expressed concerns about increasing political tensions in the Netherlands as farmers protest the perceived effect of emissions cuts on livelihoods rooted in agriculture. 

These climate security risks identified by young leader participants provide insight into why NATO allied citizens rank climate change or extreme weather as one of their top three concerns, even ahead of war, terrorism, and political instability. The NATO Summit and Public Forum in Vilnius should ignite renewed urgency to address these challenges.

Climate Security Solutions

In order to address these challenges, participants brainstormed solutions for NATO policymakers and NATO member states. These solutions included transparent and inclusive governance and adaptation and resilience building. 

Communities affected by climate change want to know what their leaders are doing to address the challenges they face and want decision-makers to listen to their priorities. Arctic representatives emphasized the importance of consultation with local residents (including those in isolated or remote areas) on Arctic climate and security issues. The new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Canada provides one opportunity to expand NATO’s engagement in the Arctic and beyond, and could offer young leaders a seat at the table to help shape NATO’s climate security priorities. Transparency among NATO members and partners on climate security practice is common sense as nations address novel transboundary climate challenges. So is engagement with young allied citizens on issues that concern their future security. 

Participants also expressed a desire to see more foresight and preparation devoted to climate adaptation, particularly related to disaster risk reduction and recovery. Disaster response is a point of connectivity for NATO member states. One participant noted that Albania relies on air support from Greece to combat wildfires and multiple countries in the region have received support from NATO allies to fight fires. To help secure their future, young leaders want to see more forward planning and transparency on how NATO will respond to disasters in its member states as the frequency and intensity of these events increases. Within this conversation, participants particularly emphasized the importance of building resilience for everyone according to a justice framework – including those who may be geographically isolated or politically marginalized. 

The IMCCS young leaders delegation will bring these ideas and more to the 2023 NATO Public Forum in Vilnius. NATO has expanded its efforts to engage the next generation of thinkers and changemakers through efforts such as the NATO 2030 Young Leaders program, and they must continue to do so. In Vilnius, they have the opportunity to gain young leaders’ insights and bolster the alliance’s commitment to inclusive peace and security in a climate-changed world. 

For more information about this project:

Watch the webinar “Climate Security in NATO’s Backyard.”

Watch the project featured onstage at the 2023 NATO Youth Summit.

Visit the project homepage

Pivoting Toward Climate Security: An Interview with Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee (ret.)

By Elsa Barron

Lieutenant General Richard Nugee (ret.) recently joined the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) as a senior advisor. He is the Non-Executive Director for Climate Change and Sustainability for the UK Government. 

Previously, he spent a year leading the Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach at the Ministry of Defence at the end of his 36-year military career. The following conversation reflects on his pivot toward climate security and his priorities and hopes for future action. It has been edited for length and clarity. 

Elsa Barron: What led you to prioritize climate change toward the end of your military career?

Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee (ret.): I sat for four years on the executive committee of defense, and climate change wasn’t mentioned, sustainability wasn’t mentioned. I realized that actually, climate change was something that the UK military wasn’t really paying attention to. There were pockets of good practice. But broadly speaking, it wasn’t being considered on a daily basis, or on a yearly basis, or even on a review basis. And so I raised it as a subject and offered to do a report examining climate change and its effects on the military, and also the impact of the military on climate change. 

There was a general feeling, and it’s very common military thinking, that we will adapt to whatever the environment is. At the end of the day, we’ll just deal with what comes, and I don’t think that is enough. When it comes to climate change, I think there are very significant opportunities for the military, but there are also circumstances that the military will find very difficult to navigate if they haven’t planned ahead. And so what I tried to do in the UK military was provoke a discussion and debate on the issue and present opportunities for action.

Barron: Are there elements of your on-the-ground experience throughout your career that have elevated your concern about climate change? 

Nugee: One example is my experience as a battle group commander in southern Iraq. We didn’t have any air conditioning and we were living in the desert where generally, it’s a very dry heat averaging about 40-45 degrees Celsius, and you can mostly cope with that. But then things change for about two weeks of the year, they call it the cooker. For two weeks, the temperature rises to 50 to 55 degrees and the direction of the wind changes. Instead of coming off the dry deserts from the north, it comes from the south, and straight across the Gulf. As a result, you get 100% humidity at around 55 degrees Celsius and it’s almost unlivable. 

What I saw was my soldiers literally trying to avoid doing anything because it was too hot. A lot of soldiers were in the hospital for short periods. A few of my soldiers went back to the UK with heatstroke. And this was them doing their jobs. And it struck me that we were unprepared. If that is an example of what climate change is going to do to certain parts of the world as they heat up, it is going to be very difficult.

There are other examples; in Afghanistan, the fact that the snow was melting faster than normal in the Hindu Kush, meant that there were floods coming down the valleys. Instead of a gentle trickle of water all year round, you get a huge flood and then you get nothing. And if you get nothing, you don’t have water for irrigation. What we found was that farmers were rapidly turning to the Taliban as a source of income. There was no ideology at all, a very high percentage of those joining the Taliban were fighting for money, they were fighting to put food on the table of their families because the Taliban paid them five dollars a day. I think it’s desperately sad that people would turn to the Taliban to fight when actually all they wanted was to have a job.

Barron: Climate change has long been underappreciated as a security threat. Yet even in just the past five years, the conversation has accelerated greatly within institutions like the UK MOD and NATO. What is your perspective on these developments?

Nugee: There’s a really good example of these issues being brought right to the forefront in Europe in the last year. That’s because Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has deliberately, in my view, weaponized energy. Why is that relevant to climate change? Because, actually, for once we have an alternative to gas, we have an alternative to oil, and that is renewable energy. By weaponizing energy, Putin has highlighted the energy security implications of reliance on oil and gas. And by doing that, he has, I hope, encouraged many to think of renewable energy as a viable and cheap alternative to fossil fuels. Europe ought to be doing everything it can to build up its energy security, and it’s now largely within our grasp.

NATO countries are beginning to take this more seriously. It’s all very well talking about it, it’s all very well having horizon scanning as to what’s happening, but that’s not enough. I think we need to act, we need to act as militaries to take advantage of technologies and persuade politicians to try and support others with access to fewer resources. We need to build a narrative that says it is in our interest to do so. I mean, I’m being very clear. This is about national security. 

Barron: I’m curious, has there ever been a moment in your work when you’ve been surprised or challenged to change your perspective on something in light of the new challenges the world is facing?

Nugee: One thing which I suppose really surprised me was the huge flooding in Pakistan last year. It is, of course, not just climate change that has caused the floods in Pakistan. It’s a number of factors combined together. But actually, climate change has exacerbated the whole problem to the extent that a third of the country was underwater. Now, why is that a concern from a national security perspective? Because actually, what happened, and it happens in Bangladesh regularly with flooding, is that the military forces pick up the pieces and try and solve the problems that these floods cause. Well, if they are doing that, you have to ask, what are they not doing in terms of protecting their nation? 

Barron: What are your hopes for the next generation of climate security leaders and what advice would you give them?

Nugee: So I think there are two elements to this. The first is to embrace the opportunities that combating climate change gives us in terms of new technologies and innovation. Why wouldn’t we want to embrace new technologies that are better for capabilities and also reduce emissions? Look through a sustainability lens on everything you do, and you will end up much more efficient and effective. 

The second piece is to invest in climate resilience in countries abroad by providing training and supporting adaptation. This builds on the ability of our militaries to think strategically, which we’re usually quite good at. It is an opportunity to help countries cope with the effects of climate change, which ultimately builds up stability around the world- including in Europe.

MSC, Munich Security Conference, Bayerischer Hof - Dachgarten Lounge: International Military Council on Climate and Security & North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cleaner and Meaner: The Military Energy Security Transition by Design

Climate & Food Security on Stage at the Munich Security Conference

By Erin Sikorsky, Patricia Parera, and Brigitte Hugh

Almost a year after the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine began, it was no surprise that the 2023 Munich Security Conference focused on the importance and implications of the ongoing conflict. This focus included a look at the second-order effects of the conflict, such as global food insecurity and the energy transition – a recognition that tackling such transnational challenges are integral to what the conference report identified as a need for “A re-envisioned liberal, rules-based international order…to strengthen democratic resilience in an era of fierce systemic competition with autocratic regimes.”

Underscoring the importance of these issues, early in the conference NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmerman, and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell met to discuss the intersection of climate change and security. As Kerry said, “While we must confront the security risks the world faces head on, we must also do so with an eye to the climate crisis, which is making these dangers worse.” 

The Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and the International Military Council for Climate and Security (IMCCS) helped drive the conversation forward on these topics at the conference through two high-level side-events: “Cleaner and Meaner: The Military Energy Security Transition by Design” and “Feeding Climate Resilience: Mapping the Security Benefits of Agriculture and Climate Adaptation.” The events included government officials, NGO and private foundation representatives, defense sector leaders and the media.

Implementing NATO’s Climate Security Action Plan

NATO and IMCCS co-hosted the Cleaner and Meaner side-event, which focused on the challenges and opportunities facing NATO members as they consider the security risks of climate change and the need to transition away from fossil fuel dependence. During the event, the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel, said that the alliance needs “to mainstream climate change and energy transition considerations into the entire NATO enterprise, including training, exercising, force planning, and the development and procurement of military capabilities.”

The conversation culminated in three key takeaways: first, public-private partnerships are critical for decarbonizing defense. As one participant put it, militaries must work with the private sector to more quickly turn clean energy technologies into capabilities. Second, competing timelines are a key challenge for militaries – the need to resupply today in the face of the Ukraine conflict with the longer timeline needed to integrate new clean energy technologies. Further complicating matters is the fact that equipment procured today may not be as useful in a warming world, and participants noted militaries will need to reexamine their assumptions and strategic planning priorities to manage such change. A third takeaway was the importance of focusing on the operational benefits of clean energy for the military. Demonstrating that investments in clean energy will help militaries achieve their core duties will help speed the transition. 

The Food and Climate Security Nexus

The Feeding Climate Resilience side-event hosted by CCS explored the intersection of food insecurity, climate change, and conflict. As one participant put it, investing in stable ground through climate and agricultural adaptation ensures that the soil is less fertile for insurgencies. The conversation emphasized three key needs: (1) the adoption of a more holistic and systems approach to the issues of climate change, food insecurity, and instability; (2) an increase in technology innovation in agriculture; and (3) more inclusive policy and decision making, from the subnational to international level. Participants discussed the need to develop, collect and disseminate concrete examples of successful and sustainable climate and food security-related initiatives which reduce conflict and build peace.   

Participants underscored the security benefits of increased support for sustainable development policies and technological innovations that promote climate-smart agriculture and investments in science and technology that target the needs of small farmers–especially women. The conversation also identified the importance of scaling up climate finance and developing more responsive and inclusive planning and policy systems for finance, water management, and markets. Perhaps the most crucial lesson in addressing the current food security challenge is the importance of partnerships, particularly at the local and subnational level and between the private sector, government and civil society, among others. South-South cooperation and Triangular cooperation, or that between developed and developing countries, is also critical. The most promising multilateral partnerships are in areas like science and technology, because they can leverage the immense capabilities and assets of the private sector in cooperation with government and civil society. 

The group concluded that tackling these issues requires a new Green Revolution. Research and innovation in agriculture are at the core of long-term food security and diminish the possibility of conflict, instability, and hunger, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Additionally, the conversation on food and climate must include water advocates as water is a key socio-economic driver for sustainable growth, livelihood, justice, food security, and labor. Without equitable and secure access to water for all, there can be no sustainable development or climate security. 

Looking Ahead

CCS and IMCCS look forward to acting on the priorities outlined by participants in both sessions through targeted research, policy development and community building to increase awareness and investment in the military energy transition, agricultural adaptation, food security, and climate resilience.

Featured image sourced from: MSC / David Hecker, Munich Security Conference.

A New Kid on the Block: NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence

By Emil Havstrup and Akash Ramnath

This article was originally published by the Planetary Security Initiative.

Earlier this year, NATO announced it will set up a new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), spearheaded by Global Affairs Canada (Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Department of National Defence (Canadian Ministry of Defence), to be based in Montreal. The COE is linked to NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which is unique, not only in its designation of the Russian Federation as an adversary of NATO, but also in identifying non-traditional threats such as climate change, to the security of the alliance. It also builds upon a Climate Change and Security Action Plan that NATO adopted in 2021. 

This could pave the way for a shift in how the alliance engages with climate change. The security dimension of climate change in NATO’s threat environment, operational capabilities, as well as its own contributions to the decarbonisation efforts, are properly acknowledged. This article will discuss what role CCASCOE can play to further NATO’s goals of awareness raising, adapting to developing climate-induced security risks and preparing militaries for a new climate reality.

The aims and focus of CCASCOE

According to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, “climate change is a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security.” To support this, NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan focuses on four approaches to meet climate-security challenges:

  1. Increased awareness of the impact of climate change on security;
  2. Adaptation of the military to climate change;
  3. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions of the military;
  4. Enhancing NATO’s outreach on this issue.

CCASCOE is expected to cover these issues, but details on its exact focus and prioritisation are still to be confirmed. However, it can be inferred that it will closely mirror NATO’s priorities on the climate and security nexus. Key to CCASCOE’s success will be its ability to leverage existing expertise from think tanks and academia, best practices from member and partner countries, as well as raising awareness and mainstreaming climate-security through key political and military command levels. Another question will be how to cooperate with other centres and training institutes, notably the NATO Centre for Excellence for Energy Security (ENSEC).

Raising Awareness

Whilst climate-security has gained traction in recent years, there is undoubtedly still apprehension within military circles to adding additional agendas to military strategy and operations, notably with regard to a focus on decarbonisation, which in their minds could possibly undermine operational effectiveness.

This fear often understates the benefits that can come with adapting and mitigating armed forces to the impacts of climate change. So-called ‘Greener’ armed forces could in fact strengthen military capabilities by both improving strategic autonomy, lowering emissions contributions and promoting the development of new technologies which might have civilian applications. CCASCOE’s role would be raising this issue with the highest political and military leaderships levels to help, at the very least, accelerate the appetite in military ranks for this issue.

CCASCOE’s position within the NATO informational framework means that it can act as a hub for raising awareness, to the benefit of climate-proofing defence policies, military doctrines and related issues such as capabilities. In addition to risk assessments (discussed below), CCASCOE could disseminate learnings and promote the vast array of climate-security analyses already in circulation. These include work done by the International Military Council on Climate and Security, SIPRI’s Climate change and Security project, the German-spearhead Weathering Risks project, International Crisis Group and the UK-financed DCAF programme amongst others.

Finally, to continue the mainstreaming process, CCASCOE could also act as a central repository for climate-security best practices adopted by military operations around the world. Whether learning how to set up a Drought Operations Coordination centre from UN peacekeeping operations to electrifying aviation to support a military energy transition, pooling and disseminating best practices is a very effective way CCASCOE can further mainstreaming the climate agenda. An example of climate-security best practices sharing is the Planetary Security Initiative, hosted by the Clingendael Institute.

Adapting allied militaries

Climate change can pose threats to NATO’s operational ability by increasing the risks to infrastructure and environmental impacts on personnel, in addition to making NATO member militaries more responsible for dealing with humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction (HADR). Earlier research by Clingendael has identified the following aspects as particularly vulnerable:

  1. Military infrastructure and installations;
  2. Mental and physical health;
  3. Equipment;
  4. Air conditioning for personnel, computer and technology;
  5. Fighter jet engine performance
  6. Clothing

The key to supporting these adaptation efforts, will be in compiling and distributing existing knowledge on how to adapt military installations to more hazardous climate such as increased flooding, or how to ensure the health of troops in environments That experiences reoccurring heatwaves. CCASCOE could carry out research on the vulnerabilities NATO faces, and potential responses. Such research might also be conducted in collaboration with the COE for Military Medicine (MILMED), establishing a pathway of coordination with other COEs is vital to avoid duplication and to enhance synergies.

Such adjustments will depend upon risk assessments that can advise on these changing operational environments. As of 2021-22, NATO has begun to carry out a yearly Climate Change and Security Impact Assessments (CCSIA), which analyses environmental vulnerabilities of NATO assets.

Yet this framework does not provide overall assessments pertaining to the specific and nuanced risks each NATO installation faces. CCASCOE could help bridge this gap by analysing and aggregating the overall risks to each member state’s installations, thus enhancing the efficacy of such assessments. To achieve this, expertise in military risk assessments would need to be acquired, as well as closer feedback relationships with national militaries. An example of how a climate-influenced operational assessment could look like is offered by Deloitte.  

In addition, CCASCOE has the potential to shape NATO’s role in responding to climate change induced calls for HADR. With the growing prevalence of extreme weather phenomena like the forest fires in Europe this summer, current HADR architecture is stretched. Thus, militaries are more likely to become first responders in this respect.

With the additional strain placed on resourcing and operations, NATO has responded by creating a Centre of Excellence for Crisis Management and Disaster Response (CMDR). CCASCOE could empower this framework by supporting the integration of insights and best practices on how climate change affects HADR operations, to help improve upon existing international programs and mechanisms, in particular the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

Mitigation and Decarbonising defence

Within the NATO security apparatus, decarbonisation and the green transition of armed forces has often played second fiddle to emerging security developments. Momentum on projects such as the Green Defence Framework adopted in 2014, which sought to introduce green standards across NATO, faced setbacks due to the Russian invasion of Crimea. CCASCOE has the potential to galvanize NATO into placing greater focus on mitigation efforts despite the organisation lacking the ability to compel allied states to transition.

Utilising the idea of being a knowledge hub, CCASCOE could also help compile and disseminate best practices specifically on military decarbonisation and the energy transition. This might better identify synergies in strategy, R&D and implementation for decarbonisation.  By tackling so-called ‘low hanging fruit’, best practices that are already tried and tested would be easier to integrate into allied militaries. This includes pilot testing carbon transformation for military aviation or utilising microgrids to enhance installations energy resilience, a development championed by the US.

Investment in technology is an issue high on NATO’s agenda. The Defence Pledge endorsed in 2014 calls for allies to spend at least 20% of their military budget on Research and Development (R&D). Though most funds are earmarked for other projects, it is reasonable to assume that CCASCOE could play a major role in encouraging partner countries to dedicate further resources to R&D focused on green energy transition.

CCASCOE could complimentarily fill this void by determining common measurement denominators for reporting Scope 1 and 2 emissions. This would also be a helpful driver towards greater transparency in military emissions reporting, with NATO announcing it was developing a methodology to do so. Either CCASCOE should take the lead or work closely with NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO).

Moreover, CCASCOE could help innovation in relation to procurement procedures. Military purchases and procurements are strictly a competence of national governments. CCASCOE might leverage its potential as a knowledge hub to reflect best practices from other militaries on green procurement. This would also be a great help for the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), who are currently attempting to lead environmental mainstreaming of procurement amongst alliance members. National governments could potentially seek out CCASCOE on their own initiative to provide added perspective on spending and future areas of saving, as well as developing green procurement guidelines.

Taking advantage of central repositories like CCASCOE might have the added benefit of strengthening the diversity and specialisations of NATO armed forces. CCASCOE’s role would be to coordinate national militaries investments in different aspects of green defence and foster synergies, best utilising available resourcing and skills, whilst avoiding duplications.

A huge task ahead

Centres of Excellence and formalised best practice sharing channels are no guarantee of accelerating climate-sensitivities in militaries. However, CCASCOE can offer a central repository for strategic insights of how climate change impacts NATO’s capabilities and the ability of the alliance to respond to them. By being relatively high level on the strategy side, CCASCOE is unlikely to infringe on other, more implementation-orientated COEs, as well as further formalising NATO’s commitment to achieving net-zero by 2050.

In the coming months, the design of the COE will be further refined by Canada and fellow NATO Allies. It will be interesting to see which partners are brought in and what the focus will be of this ‘new kid’ on the climate-security block. Climate threats are only likely to grow, meaning NATO will need all the help it can get.

Call for Submissions: Young Leaders: NATO and Climate Security in my Backyard

By Elsa Barron

Are you a young person concerned about the impacts of climate change on well-being and security in your home community? Is your community pursuing innovative approaches to managing climate risks that increase safety and security for your neighbors? Do you have a message to share with policymakers across NATO nations about the opportunities and challenges your home will face in a warming world? The International Military Council on  Climate and Security (IMCCS) and the U.S. Mission to NATO want to hear your story. We are launching a call for young people to submit short videos showcasing their personal climate security stories. NATO has increased its ambition on climate change over the past few years and your fresh perspectives can help them drive their action even further. 

Selected videos will be featured in a #MyClimateSecurityStory social media campaign showcasing youth experiences with climate security risks across the Arctic, the Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. In addition to being featured on social media, selected individuals will be invited to a Young Leaders’ Climate Security Dialogue with the potential for in-person engagement at a NATO ministerial meeting.

Read the full Call for Submissions and apply here.

REPORT: IMCCS Contributes Chapter on Security to Global Center on Adaptation 2022 Report

By Brigitte Hugh and Elsa Barron

Ahead of the 27th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Global Center on Adaptation released the State and Trends in Africa Report 2022 (STA22) which completes an overview of the present and projected climate risks in Africa and provides a blueprint for adaptation action. 

This year, the chapter on security was provided by the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) Expert Group, co-authored by  Elsa Barron of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and Laura Birkman of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). 

The chapter advocates the need to “climate-proof” security action and “conflict-proof” climate adaptation. This message is underscored through the chapter’s five key messages: 

  1. As a “threat multiplier,” climate change exacerbates fragile situations and worsens social tensions and upheaval. Therefore, countries with fragile socioeconomic and political systems are especially susceptible to the security impacts of climate change.
  2. There can be no adaptation without security, just as there is no security without adaptation. Without effective governance and social and political stability, adaptation projects fall to the wayside, or may even risk exacerbating population vulnerability if they do not consider emergent security risks. 
  3. A range of early-warning systems (EWS) have emerged in the African context, which effectively warn and inform about dimensions of climate and conflict. EWS should rely on local actors and their knowledge in order to prevent maladaptation and to not enhance or exacerbate existing vulnerabilities of local and marginalized communities.
  4. Integrating dialogue into the planning and implementation stages of all adaptation projects is important for addressing community concerns. Otherwise, adaptation projects could create economic or social winners and losers, increasing instability among the local population. Dialogue programs help to avert these missteps toward maladaptation and establish local partnerships that are more resilient to climate and conflict risks.
  5. Regional and local security sectors in Africa have a significant opportunity to engage in climate adaptation and climate-security risk reduction. This is because, in many cases, they may be the only existing or best-equipped force to prepare for and respond to disasters. 

To read the chapter on security, click here. To read the full report click here.

Just and Comprehensive Action on Climate Security in Australia and Beyond: An Interview with Cheryl Durrant

By Elsa Barron

The Australian Security Leaders Climate Group (ASLCG), a partner of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), is working to reframe the climate debate in Australia to address the multifaceted security risks posed by climate change. The group recently released its second report, an Australian Climate and Security Risk Assessment Implementation Proposal. I spoke with Cheryl Durrant, an executive member of the ASLCG and former Director of Preparedness & Mobilization at the Australian Department of Defense, about this report and the path towards just and comprehensive action on climate security risks for Australia and beyond.

Elsa Barron: How did you initially become concerned about the intersection between climate change and security challenges? How did that concern evolve over the course of your career and ultimately lead to the creation of the ASLCG?

Cheryl Durrant: Curiously, I am a military historian and I first understood the relationship between climate and security when I was studying the collapse of middle-American civilizations, which was partly an environmental collapse. That was my start, but I really became aware of the urgency and extremity of the current climate change crisis in 2012 when I commissioned a piece of work from our [The Australian] Defense Science and Technology Group on global change. From all of the global challenges presented in the report, climate change leapt out as different from the others in three ways: pervasiveness, probability, and scale. Climate change was happening everywhere, it was almost certain, and it had the potential to destroy civilizations and cause probable extinction if left unchecked. 

Barron: I’m curious, in addition to your own journey and interest, how have you seen the security community approach the connection between climate change?

Durrant: I think there are two strands to it. One is based on the ground. When we started going out and talking about climate change at international conferences and with other militaries, we constantly heard the same story: that the soldiers have already grasped this concept from the ground up. They are in the same training range every year and the landscape is changing. Soldiers and sailors are some of the most profound supporters of this work because they are in it every day. 

Then there is the second strand which is a more theoretical analysis of climate change as a geopolitical security challenge. This issue poses a dilemma for security professionals because it is a problem that is without boundaries. It doesn’t follow standard geopolitical thinking. You can’t think of it as a traditional enemy, because you contribute to it as well. You can’t fight yourself because you’re putting carbon in the atmosphere. 

Barron: Last year, ASLCG published its inaugural report titled, “Missing in Action: Responding to Australia’s Climate & Security Failure.” What has guided the progression from that report to the release of your most recent, solutions-oriented report, “Australian Climate & Security Risk Assessment?”

Durrant: If you see action on climate change as a campaign, which is a framing we are used to in the military, then the first step of that campaign is to get the government and the people of Australia to connect climate change to security. Then, they can recognize that action is needed and take steps towards that action. The ASLCG has been in the raising awareness step. Now we’ve largely accomplished the goal of that first step: the current government has adopted our policy suggestion of integrating a climate risk assessment. Now, we are in the second phase of the campaign which is moving from awareness to understanding and action.

When I started seriously looking into this problem in 2012, the general thinking was that we weren’t going to see catastrophic climate security impacts until 2100 or later. By 2015, we were concerned that we might see those catastrophic effects by mid-century. Now, we are seeing catastrophic effects for some parts of the planet already – horrific events this summer in Europe, Africa, South Asia, Australia, and North America. The time horizon we have to take action is really very short.

With our most recent report, we are recommending a broad risk assessment because that is a way to engage not only government, but also business, think tanks, and the general community to understand we are in a crisis mode. Unless everyone understands we are in crisis mode, then people aren’t prepared to make the sacrifices that a crisis mode entails. The response to the climate crisis will not be a smooth path, it will be a bumpy path and we need a mindset change to understand how urgent, how large, and how globally interconnected the climate risks that we face really are. 

Barron: ASLCG’s report argues that existential risks must be treated differently in policy-making than standard risks. How does this apply to climate security risks? Are there examples of low-probability yet high-impact risks that should be given more attention?

Durrant: From my perspective, there are probably two major existential risks we should be thinking about and they’re interconnected. Existential risk indicates the possibility of civilization collapse or human extinction. This kind of risk is not really comparable to something like an economic decline of 10 percent; it’s an entirely different scale and you really have to get your head around the gravity of that difference. 

The two risks that I elevate to this level are climate change and nuclear conflict. These carry the potential to cause human extinction or civilization collapse to such an extent that it might never come back again. They’re also connected because climate change escalates the risk of conflict and the fear of nuclear war is putting a break on some of the international cooperation we want to see around climate change. These two risks are now circling and exacerbating each other. There is a whole range of other existential risks like super volcano eruptions or solar events, but humanity has less capacity to control those risks. Let’s focus on the two that we can act on.

Barron: How do you communicate this level of risk? You mentioned that communication is often focused on hope because it is more empowering to people, so how do you really communicate the scale of risk in a way that is effective at galvanizing action?

Durrant: Risk is best communicated through lived experience. I already mentioned the soldier who feels the impacts of climate change in his bones as he’s losing his Christmases because he has to keep responding to fires. The bush that he loves and appreciates because he’s been training in it for 30 years is changing. He doesn’t see the little animals or birds he normally sees. It’s deeply felt and understood. It’s not an intellectual thing, it’s an experience of the heart. 

That’s why in our approach to the integrated risk assessment, we wanted to go further than pure analysis. We won’t change minds through glossy reports, we’ll do it by sitting down face-to-face with people. I see an amazing connection between the ecological security work that the IMCCS is doing and permaculture movements. Call it what you want– ecological security, environmental justice, intergenerational responsibility– but the goals are the same. It’s important to connect these movements together rather than separate them if we want to create change. 

That requires the thinkers and leaders, such as the security leaders, to go humbly amongst the public and have their one-on-one, face-to-face, small group conversation and build the movement from the bottom-up. Ultimately, we need a social tipping point. Yes, physically it is a problem of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But, in terms of the human cause and response, it’s a social movement challenge. Without a social tipping point, I don’t see our action being quick enough or big enough to avert a worsening crisis. 

Barron: The ASLCG report advocates using scenarios methodology for carrying out a risk assessment. In the case of Australia, what parties should be brought into scenario planning to conduct a thorough analysis of climate security?

Durrant: It’s important that scenarios are an immersive experience. In order to create that immersion, I think there are three main groups that are important: security professionals, climate science and sector impact experts (e.g. economy, health, environment, infrastructure), and community and civic groups. I think it’s really important to bring these groups all together. By design, the assessment will help information to flow from the bottom-up. 

These integrated scenarios provide opportunities for creativity, for example, imagining plausible utopias. How do we rethink international security and creatively imagine the rules of a different world? I think this creativity is really important because the right-brained thinkers– the intelligence officers and the security analysts– are very good at dystopias but not very good at utopias. I think bringing the creative arts, storytelling sector, and other strange bedfellows for the security world into the conversation is important for addressing this multifaceted crisis. 

We also need diverse groups to solve diverse planetary problems. The answer to an African problem might be from an Indian solution and the answer to an American problem might come from a Nordic solution and the answer to an Australian problem might come from a Chinese solution, so we can’t afford to not share the solutions. It’s also important to get youth and other groups involved that also come with unique skills and perspectives. 

Barron: I completely agree with your points on diversity and also youth engagement, do you see that as a part of the positive social tipping point we’re working towards?

Durrant: Yes, and it’s people coming with their authentic voices as well. We have a certain paradigm that can be reductionist, patriarchal, and capitalist. There are many assumptions that are deeply embedded in how we think. Women’s voices, Indigenous voices, non-Western voices, and youth voices are not captive in that paradigm. 

Certain rules of thinking tend to run very deep in the security community. Traditionally, security is about a bad guy, whereas the climate crisis doesn’t really have a clearly defined adversary. That means there is a whole body of learning you need to put aside in order to think differently, and it’s a very hard transformation to make. Our mindset for dealing with problems doesn’t often get to the root cause. 

Barron: What is at stake for Australia if it falls behind its allies and partners in getting to those root causes? In contrast, what opportunities exist if Australia steps up its commitment to combating these challenges?

Durrant: I’ll start with the opportunities. Australia can be a leader because, uniquely among the western alliance, it’s very rich in renewable energy resources and also agricultural resources; it’s a net exporter. Even with its major climate vulnerabilities, the biocapacity of the Australian continent to continue to produce food is substantial. When the world starts to get short of food and needs secure access to critical minerals, Australia can be there. Australia also has masses of nuclear, hydrogen, wind, and solar energy so it’s actually really well poised to be a renewable energy superpower. 

Australia has a choice in how to use this power. It can choose to perpetrate great power to control and shape the world in our favor. Or, it can use its force to address social justice concerns and provide resources to those who need them most.  We have to think globally and not just locally and transform the mindset from thinking “oh we’re lucky we don’t have to work too hard”, to thinking “wow, we’re fortunate, we can help others and lead the transition.” Some of that shift is evident in the government’s efforts. They are seeing that they can be a force for good and need to choose that path. 

Read about the ASLCG’s first report, “Missing in Action,” here

Summer Heatwave Underscores Importance of NATO’s Climate Security Focus

By Erin Sikorsky

On July 18, the UK Royal Air Force halted flights out of its largest airbase because the ‘runway had melted’ – a line my colleagues suggested they’d expect to read in a dystopian science fiction novel about the future. Alas, this headline was all too real, as countries across Europe battled record climate change-driven heatwaves. 

While part of the RAF was (temporarily) grounded, other European militaries – in Spain, Germany, France, Portugal, Cyprus, and Slovenia – were helping fight unprecedented fires across their countries. Nearly half of the EU and UK is at risk of drought, with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center assessing that water and heat stress are driving crop yields down and straining energy production across the continent. Given that food and energy crises were expected well before this heatwave struck, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg could not have asked for a better illustration of his assertion that climate change is a “crisis multiplier.”

Stoltenberg uttered that phrase just a few weeks before this latest spate of climate hazards, at the annual NATO leaders Summit in Madrid, where the alliance announced a goal of reducing emissions by at least 45 percent by 2030 and reducing to net zero by 2050. Saying “what can be measured can be cut,” Stoltenberg noted NATO had created a new methodology for measuring military emissions. Details of the methodology have not yet been released, however, though a press report suggests the base comparison year will be 2019, and the 45 percent target will apply to NATO political and military facilities as well as NATO-owned military equipment like surveillance planes and drones.

There were other climate announcements at the Summit as well. The new Strategic Concept for the alliance—a high level guiding document—refers repeatedly to risks from climate change, emphasizing crisis prevention and cooperative security as pathways to manage climate risks. NATO also released a “Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment”, as required by the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan adopted by the alliance. The new assessment provides a high-level analysis of how climate change is impacting NATO in four key areas: 1 ) the strategic environment; 2) its assets and installations; 3) its missions and multi-domain operations; and 4) its resilience and civil preparedness. The report also includes a useful graphic identifying mitigation, adaptation and overlapping opportunities for the alliance going forward. 

Importantly, NATO is not just identifying risks, but also funding opportunities to tackle them. The alliance revealed a new $1 billion Innovation Fund at the Summit – the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund to invest in dual-use technologies, including in the energy arena. The fund complements NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic – or DIANA – which supports the development and adaptation of dual-use emerging technologies to critical security and defense challenges.  As the IMCCS Expert Group’s new report, Decarbonized Defense, noted, both of these initiatives could play an important role in clean energy and climate adaptation technologies.

Overall, NATO moved the ball down the field on climate security in the 2022 summit, but there is much more to do if the alliance is to truly prepare its member countries for the climate security threats that are already here, much less the even more intensified effects expected in the next few decades. Going forward, the alliance should focus its efforts in three areas: 

1) Showcase Operational Effectiveness: NATO should continue to identify and promote climate mitigation and adaptation opportunities that will increase military effectiveness. This approach will be key to bringing along countries in the alliance that are more skeptical of climate action;

2) Share Best Practices: Many countries within the alliance are already pursuing clean energy technologies and new adaptation strategies. The new Climate Security Center of Excellence, led by Canada, can play an important role in convening member states to exchange ideas and information, and train a new generation of NATO leaders in best practices for integrating climate considerations; 

3) Emphasize Transparency: NATO should release a version of the methodology for measuring emissions and share its process with NATO partners around the world. It should also publish metrics for measuring its progress across its climate agenda. 

The past year has underscored the critical importance and relevance of NATO, as the alliance has come together in the face of unwarranted Russian aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, both the Russian invasion and the summer heatwave have demonstrated the serious security risks of continuing dependence on fossil fuels, and the threats posed by climate change. Ensuring NATO is fit for purpose in the coming decades requires a continued and deepened commitment to keeping climate change front and center in the alliance’s strategies and plans.