Young Leaders to Bring Climate Security Priorities to the NATO Public Forum

By Elsa Barron

On July 11th and 12th, the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), with support from the U.S. Mission to NATO, will bring a delegation of six young leaders to the NATO Public Forum 2023, accompanied by the Center for Climate and Security’s Elsa Barron and IMCCS Secretary General, Sherri Goodman. Pau Alvarez Aragones (Spain), Diana Garlytska (Ukraine/ Lithuania), Marieke Jacobs (Netherlands), Michelle Ramirez (United States), George Tavridis (Greece), and Ytze de Vries (Netherlands) will be in attendance. They represent a group of twelve young leaders who were selected for the IMCCS young leaders network based on their video messages on the theme “Climate Security in My Backyard.”

In an April webinar and workshop, the group was joined by the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith, who shared that young people’s unprecedented mobilization on the issue of climate change illustrates their underlying power to move mountains, or transform seemingly entrenched systems to create positive change. With this as inspiration, the group cultivated innovative ideas based on their experiences with climate security risks at home, as well as potential solutions to this transnational challenge, which they will bring with them to Vilnius.

Climate Security Risks

Workshop participants identified the direct risks of extreme weather, water scarcity, food insecurity (including in marine environments), permafrost thaw, and wildfire on the health and stability of their regions. Without clear and transparent plans to curtail climate change and address these increasingly extreme conditions, participants argued that it is challenging for their generation to feel secure, even in their own homes. 

The group also discussed the compound impacts of increasing temperatures and ecological change, which place additional strains on security. In conditions such as drought and permafrost thaw described above, more communities are facing the painstaking decision to leave home. These decisions can be extremely dangerous, exemplified by casualties along the sea crossing to countries in the northern Mediterranean. Climate change hazards also affect the security of healthcare systems already impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, unhealthy air due to wildfire smoke is now a regular summer occurrence in Alaska, making the environment unsafe and straining the healthcare system. 

Finally, the group identified important security risks connected to the response to climate change, particularly related to research and technology. Understanding and addressing climate change in the Arctic has become more complex since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent breakdown of scientific and policy cooperation. Participants also discussed new resource dependencies and unequal access to technology in the midst of the energy transition, which could result in additional internal and international tensions. For example, one participant expressed concerns about increasing political tensions in the Netherlands as farmers protest the perceived effect of emissions cuts on livelihoods rooted in agriculture. 

These climate security risks identified by young leader participants provide insight into why NATO allied citizens rank climate change or extreme weather as one of their top three concerns, even ahead of war, terrorism, and political instability. The NATO Summit and Public Forum in Vilnius should ignite renewed urgency to address these challenges.

Climate Security Solutions

In order to address these challenges, participants brainstormed solutions for NATO policymakers and NATO member states. These solutions included transparent and inclusive governance and adaptation and resilience building. 

Communities affected by climate change want to know what their leaders are doing to address the challenges they face and want decision-makers to listen to their priorities. Arctic representatives emphasized the importance of consultation with local residents (including those in isolated or remote areas) on Arctic climate and security issues. The new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Canada provides one opportunity to expand NATO’s engagement in the Arctic and beyond, and could offer young leaders a seat at the table to help shape NATO’s climate security priorities. Transparency among NATO members and partners on climate security practice is common sense as nations address novel transboundary climate challenges. So is engagement with young allied citizens on issues that concern their future security. 

Participants also expressed a desire to see more foresight and preparation devoted to climate adaptation, particularly related to disaster risk reduction and recovery. Disaster response is a point of connectivity for NATO member states. One participant noted that Albania relies on air support from Greece to combat wildfires and multiple countries in the region have received support from NATO allies to fight fires. To help secure their future, young leaders want to see more forward planning and transparency on how NATO will respond to disasters in its member states as the frequency and intensity of these events increases. Within this conversation, participants particularly emphasized the importance of building resilience for everyone according to a justice framework – including those who may be geographically isolated or politically marginalized. 

The IMCCS young leaders delegation will bring these ideas and more to the 2023 NATO Public Forum in Vilnius. NATO has expanded its efforts to engage the next generation of thinkers and changemakers through efforts such as the NATO 2030 Young Leaders program, and they must continue to do so. In Vilnius, they have the opportunity to gain young leaders’ insights and bolster the alliance’s commitment to inclusive peace and security in a climate-changed world. 

For more information about this project:

Watch the webinar “Climate Security in NATO’s Backyard.”

Watch the project featured onstage at the 2023 NATO Youth Summit.

Visit the project homepage

Pivoting Toward Climate Security: An Interview with Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee (ret.)

By Elsa Barron

Lieutenant General Richard Nugee (ret.) recently joined the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) as a senior advisor. He is the Non-Executive Director for Climate Change and Sustainability for the UK Government. 

Previously, he spent a year leading the Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach at the Ministry of Defence at the end of his 36-year military career. The following conversation reflects on his pivot toward climate security and his priorities and hopes for future action. It has been edited for length and clarity. 

Elsa Barron: What led you to prioritize climate change toward the end of your military career?

Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee (ret.): I sat for four years on the executive committee of defense, and climate change wasn’t mentioned, sustainability wasn’t mentioned. I realized that actually, climate change was something that the UK military wasn’t really paying attention to. There were pockets of good practice. But broadly speaking, it wasn’t being considered on a daily basis, or on a yearly basis, or even on a review basis. And so I raised it as a subject and offered to do a report examining climate change and its effects on the military, and also the impact of the military on climate change. 

There was a general feeling, and it’s very common military thinking, that we will adapt to whatever the environment is. At the end of the day, we’ll just deal with what comes, and I don’t think that is enough. When it comes to climate change, I think there are very significant opportunities for the military, but there are also circumstances that the military will find very difficult to navigate if they haven’t planned ahead. And so what I tried to do in the UK military was provoke a discussion and debate on the issue and present opportunities for action.

Barron: Are there elements of your on-the-ground experience throughout your career that have elevated your concern about climate change? 

Nugee: One example is my experience as a battle group commander in southern Iraq. We didn’t have any air conditioning and we were living in the desert where generally, it’s a very dry heat averaging about 40-45 degrees Celsius, and you can mostly cope with that. But then things change for about two weeks of the year, they call it the cooker. For two weeks, the temperature rises to 50 to 55 degrees and the direction of the wind changes. Instead of coming off the dry deserts from the north, it comes from the south, and straight across the Gulf. As a result, you get 100% humidity at around 55 degrees Celsius and it’s almost unlivable. 

What I saw was my soldiers literally trying to avoid doing anything because it was too hot. A lot of soldiers were in the hospital for short periods. A few of my soldiers went back to the UK with heatstroke. And this was them doing their jobs. And it struck me that we were unprepared. If that is an example of what climate change is going to do to certain parts of the world as they heat up, it is going to be very difficult.

There are other examples; in Afghanistan, the fact that the snow was melting faster than normal in the Hindu Kush, meant that there were floods coming down the valleys. Instead of a gentle trickle of water all year round, you get a huge flood and then you get nothing. And if you get nothing, you don’t have water for irrigation. What we found was that farmers were rapidly turning to the Taliban as a source of income. There was no ideology at all, a very high percentage of those joining the Taliban were fighting for money, they were fighting to put food on the table of their families because the Taliban paid them five dollars a day. I think it’s desperately sad that people would turn to the Taliban to fight when actually all they wanted was to have a job.

Barron: Climate change has long been underappreciated as a security threat. Yet even in just the past five years, the conversation has accelerated greatly within institutions like the UK MOD and NATO. What is your perspective on these developments?

Nugee: There’s a really good example of these issues being brought right to the forefront in Europe in the last year. That’s because Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has deliberately, in my view, weaponized energy. Why is that relevant to climate change? Because, actually, for once we have an alternative to gas, we have an alternative to oil, and that is renewable energy. By weaponizing energy, Putin has highlighted the energy security implications of reliance on oil and gas. And by doing that, he has, I hope, encouraged many to think of renewable energy as a viable and cheap alternative to fossil fuels. Europe ought to be doing everything it can to build up its energy security, and it’s now largely within our grasp.

NATO countries are beginning to take this more seriously. It’s all very well talking about it, it’s all very well having horizon scanning as to what’s happening, but that’s not enough. I think we need to act, we need to act as militaries to take advantage of technologies and persuade politicians to try and support others with access to fewer resources. We need to build a narrative that says it is in our interest to do so. I mean, I’m being very clear. This is about national security. 

Barron: I’m curious, has there ever been a moment in your work when you’ve been surprised or challenged to change your perspective on something in light of the new challenges the world is facing?

Nugee: One thing which I suppose really surprised me was the huge flooding in Pakistan last year. It is, of course, not just climate change that has caused the floods in Pakistan. It’s a number of factors combined together. But actually, climate change has exacerbated the whole problem to the extent that a third of the country was underwater. Now, why is that a concern from a national security perspective? Because actually, what happened, and it happens in Bangladesh regularly with flooding, is that the military forces pick up the pieces and try and solve the problems that these floods cause. Well, if they are doing that, you have to ask, what are they not doing in terms of protecting their nation? 

Barron: What are your hopes for the next generation of climate security leaders and what advice would you give them?

Nugee: So I think there are two elements to this. The first is to embrace the opportunities that combating climate change gives us in terms of new technologies and innovation. Why wouldn’t we want to embrace new technologies that are better for capabilities and also reduce emissions? Look through a sustainability lens on everything you do, and you will end up much more efficient and effective. 

The second piece is to invest in climate resilience in countries abroad by providing training and supporting adaptation. This builds on the ability of our militaries to think strategically, which we’re usually quite good at. It is an opportunity to help countries cope with the effects of climate change, which ultimately builds up stability around the world- including in Europe.

EVENT: Climate Security in NATO’s Backyard: A Discussion with Young Leaders

By Elsa Barron

On April 21st, the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), supported by the U.S. Mission to NATO, will host the webinar, “Climate Security in NATO’s Backyard: A Discussion with Young Leaders” from 9:30-10:15 am Eastern Time (3:30-4:15 pm Central European Time). 

NATO’s most recent polling data shows that the risks of climate change and extreme weather are top of mind for NATO country citizens, with 32 percent ranking it as their greatest concern, above the risk of war, terrorism, or political instability. 

As NATO develops its climate security ambition while simultaneously navigating an ongoing conflict in Europe, engaging meaningfully with young leaders is critical for future sustainability and security. The Alliance has much to gain from young leaders’ innovative and systematic ideas for addressing globalized and interconnected challenges such as climate change and conflict.

IMCCS Director Erin Sikorsky and IMCCS Secretary General Sherri Goodman will welcome the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith and NATO 2030 Young Leader Katarina Kertysova for a conversation on a future vision for peace and security. The conversation will then transition into a discussion moderated by CCS Research Fellow Elsa Barron featuring young leaders from across ten countries, including:

  • Pau Alvarez Aragones, Spain
  • Virginia Bertuzzi, Italy
  • Selma Bichbich, Algeria
  • Jackson Blackwell, United States
  • Diana Garlytska, Ukraine (based in Lithuania)
  • Marieke Jacobs, Netherlands
  • Kostian Jano, Albania
  • Sofia Kabbej, France
  • Andrej Mitreski, North Macedonia
  • Michelle Ramirez, United States
  • George Tavridis, Greece
  • Ytze de Vries, Netherlands

CCS and IMCCS to Host Events on Food Security and the Clean Energy Transition at the Munich Security Conference

The Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) in partnership with NATO look forward to hosting innovative conversations on key climate security issues, including food security and the clean energy transition, at the Munich Security Conference set to take place February 17-19, 2023. 

Food Security

Climate change is a strategically significant security risk that will affect our most basic resources, including food, with potentially dire security ramifications. National and international security communities, including militaries and intelligence agencies, understand these risks and are taking action to anticipate them. However, progress in mitigating these risks will require deeper collaboration among the climate change, agriculture and food security, and national security communities through targeted research, policy development, and community building. 

In order to address these challenges, CCS will host an interactive roundtable under the title “Feeding Climate Resilience: Mapping the Security Benefits of Agriculture and Climate Adaptation” with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, featuring a high-level discussion aimed at identifying further areas of cooperation among these sectors and exploring possible areas for policy action.

The Clean Energy Transition

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent global energy crisis, coupled with the last few years of unprecedented extreme heat, droughts, and floods, have revealed a new, more complex security reality for NATO countries. Navigating this reality requires militaries to systematically recognize the opportunities and challenges that exist within the nexus between climate change and security, and the global clean energy transition. 

The deterioration in Euro-Atlantic security will lead to increases in Alliance military procurement as well as the intensity of training, exercising, and patrolling. Such investment decisions can maintain and enhance operational effectiveness and collective defense requirements by taking advantage of the innovative solutions offered by the green energy transition that are designed for future operating environments while contributing to individual countries’ UNFCCC Paris Agreement commitments. However, it is also important to identify and mitigate new dependencies created by a switch from Russian fossil fuels to a critical minerals supply chain currently dominated by China and to think holistically about interoperability and other factors of relevance to the Alliance.

A roundtable discussion titled “Cleaner and Meaner: The Military Energy Transition by Design” and hosted by IMCCS and NATO will identify key opportunities to speed NATO militaries’ transition to clean energy, as well as challenges/obstacles that require cooperation and strategic planning across the Alliance. The conversation will seek to identify next steps for NATO countries, including through technological innovation and partnerships with the private sector, and builds on conversations about the implementation of climate security planning hosted by IMCCS and NATO at the 2022 conference.


Follow us here and on social media for more coming out of this year’s conversations at MSC.

IMCCS Welcomes Two New Institutional Partners

By Elsa Barron

As the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) kicks off another year of climate security action, the network is excited to announce two new institutional partners to bolster its global engagement: the Climate Change & (In)Security Project and the Swedish Defence University. IMCCS institutional partners come from over a dozen countries and contribute a wide range of climate and security expertise to the network. 

With a focus on the UK and its interests, the Climate Change & (In)Security Project (CCIP) explores the insecurities created by climate change and how to respond to them. CCIP is a collaboration between the University of Oxford and the British Army’s Centre for Historical and Armed Conflict Research (CHACR). CCIP channels the highest quality research and analysis into military, government, and other practitioner understanding and decision-making.

The Swedish Defence University is a world-leading university in the fields of defense, crisis management, and security. Its mission is to generate and disseminate knowledge in these areas and create partnerships and collaboration in service to society. Through research, education, and collaboration the Swedish Defence University contributes to Sweden’s defense capability, total defense, national and international security, and sustainable democratic societies.

The IMCCS welcomes these new additions and looks forward to a fruitful collaboration.

A New Kid on the Block: NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence

By Emil Havstrup and Akash Ramnath

This article was originally published by the Planetary Security Initiative.

Earlier this year, NATO announced it will set up a new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), spearheaded by Global Affairs Canada (Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Department of National Defence (Canadian Ministry of Defence), to be based in Montreal. The COE is linked to NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which is unique, not only in its designation of the Russian Federation as an adversary of NATO, but also in identifying non-traditional threats such as climate change, to the security of the alliance. It also builds upon a Climate Change and Security Action Plan that NATO adopted in 2021. 

This could pave the way for a shift in how the alliance engages with climate change. The security dimension of climate change in NATO’s threat environment, operational capabilities, as well as its own contributions to the decarbonisation efforts, are properly acknowledged. This article will discuss what role CCASCOE can play to further NATO’s goals of awareness raising, adapting to developing climate-induced security risks and preparing militaries for a new climate reality.

The aims and focus of CCASCOE

According to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, “climate change is a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security.” To support this, NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan focuses on four approaches to meet climate-security challenges:

  1. Increased awareness of the impact of climate change on security;
  2. Adaptation of the military to climate change;
  3. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions of the military;
  4. Enhancing NATO’s outreach on this issue.

CCASCOE is expected to cover these issues, but details on its exact focus and prioritisation are still to be confirmed. However, it can be inferred that it will closely mirror NATO’s priorities on the climate and security nexus. Key to CCASCOE’s success will be its ability to leverage existing expertise from think tanks and academia, best practices from member and partner countries, as well as raising awareness and mainstreaming climate-security through key political and military command levels. Another question will be how to cooperate with other centres and training institutes, notably the NATO Centre for Excellence for Energy Security (ENSEC).

Raising Awareness

Whilst climate-security has gained traction in recent years, there is undoubtedly still apprehension within military circles to adding additional agendas to military strategy and operations, notably with regard to a focus on decarbonisation, which in their minds could possibly undermine operational effectiveness.

This fear often understates the benefits that can come with adapting and mitigating armed forces to the impacts of climate change. So-called ‘Greener’ armed forces could in fact strengthen military capabilities by both improving strategic autonomy, lowering emissions contributions and promoting the development of new technologies which might have civilian applications. CCASCOE’s role would be raising this issue with the highest political and military leaderships levels to help, at the very least, accelerate the appetite in military ranks for this issue.

CCASCOE’s position within the NATO informational framework means that it can act as a hub for raising awareness, to the benefit of climate-proofing defence policies, military doctrines and related issues such as capabilities. In addition to risk assessments (discussed below), CCASCOE could disseminate learnings and promote the vast array of climate-security analyses already in circulation. These include work done by the International Military Council on Climate and Security, SIPRI’s Climate change and Security project, the German-spearhead Weathering Risks project, International Crisis Group and the UK-financed DCAF programme amongst others.

Finally, to continue the mainstreaming process, CCASCOE could also act as a central repository for climate-security best practices adopted by military operations around the world. Whether learning how to set up a Drought Operations Coordination centre from UN peacekeeping operations to electrifying aviation to support a military energy transition, pooling and disseminating best practices is a very effective way CCASCOE can further mainstreaming the climate agenda. An example of climate-security best practices sharing is the Planetary Security Initiative, hosted by the Clingendael Institute.

Adapting allied militaries

Climate change can pose threats to NATO’s operational ability by increasing the risks to infrastructure and environmental impacts on personnel, in addition to making NATO member militaries more responsible for dealing with humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction (HADR). Earlier research by Clingendael has identified the following aspects as particularly vulnerable:

  1. Military infrastructure and installations;
  2. Mental and physical health;
  3. Equipment;
  4. Air conditioning for personnel, computer and technology;
  5. Fighter jet engine performance
  6. Clothing

The key to supporting these adaptation efforts, will be in compiling and distributing existing knowledge on how to adapt military installations to more hazardous climate such as increased flooding, or how to ensure the health of troops in environments That experiences reoccurring heatwaves. CCASCOE could carry out research on the vulnerabilities NATO faces, and potential responses. Such research might also be conducted in collaboration with the COE for Military Medicine (MILMED), establishing a pathway of coordination with other COEs is vital to avoid duplication and to enhance synergies.

Such adjustments will depend upon risk assessments that can advise on these changing operational environments. As of 2021-22, NATO has begun to carry out a yearly Climate Change and Security Impact Assessments (CCSIA), which analyses environmental vulnerabilities of NATO assets.

Yet this framework does not provide overall assessments pertaining to the specific and nuanced risks each NATO installation faces. CCASCOE could help bridge this gap by analysing and aggregating the overall risks to each member state’s installations, thus enhancing the efficacy of such assessments. To achieve this, expertise in military risk assessments would need to be acquired, as well as closer feedback relationships with national militaries. An example of how a climate-influenced operational assessment could look like is offered by Deloitte.  

In addition, CCASCOE has the potential to shape NATO’s role in responding to climate change induced calls for HADR. With the growing prevalence of extreme weather phenomena like the forest fires in Europe this summer, current HADR architecture is stretched. Thus, militaries are more likely to become first responders in this respect.

With the additional strain placed on resourcing and operations, NATO has responded by creating a Centre of Excellence for Crisis Management and Disaster Response (CMDR). CCASCOE could empower this framework by supporting the integration of insights and best practices on how climate change affects HADR operations, to help improve upon existing international programs and mechanisms, in particular the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

Mitigation and Decarbonising defence

Within the NATO security apparatus, decarbonisation and the green transition of armed forces has often played second fiddle to emerging security developments. Momentum on projects such as the Green Defence Framework adopted in 2014, which sought to introduce green standards across NATO, faced setbacks due to the Russian invasion of Crimea. CCASCOE has the potential to galvanize NATO into placing greater focus on mitigation efforts despite the organisation lacking the ability to compel allied states to transition.

Utilising the idea of being a knowledge hub, CCASCOE could also help compile and disseminate best practices specifically on military decarbonisation and the energy transition. This might better identify synergies in strategy, R&D and implementation for decarbonisation.  By tackling so-called ‘low hanging fruit’, best practices that are already tried and tested would be easier to integrate into allied militaries. This includes pilot testing carbon transformation for military aviation or utilising microgrids to enhance installations energy resilience, a development championed by the US.

Investment in technology is an issue high on NATO’s agenda. The Defence Pledge endorsed in 2014 calls for allies to spend at least 20% of their military budget on Research and Development (R&D). Though most funds are earmarked for other projects, it is reasonable to assume that CCASCOE could play a major role in encouraging partner countries to dedicate further resources to R&D focused on green energy transition.

CCASCOE could complimentarily fill this void by determining common measurement denominators for reporting Scope 1 and 2 emissions. This would also be a helpful driver towards greater transparency in military emissions reporting, with NATO announcing it was developing a methodology to do so. Either CCASCOE should take the lead or work closely with NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO).

Moreover, CCASCOE could help innovation in relation to procurement procedures. Military purchases and procurements are strictly a competence of national governments. CCASCOE might leverage its potential as a knowledge hub to reflect best practices from other militaries on green procurement. This would also be a great help for the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), who are currently attempting to lead environmental mainstreaming of procurement amongst alliance members. National governments could potentially seek out CCASCOE on their own initiative to provide added perspective on spending and future areas of saving, as well as developing green procurement guidelines.

Taking advantage of central repositories like CCASCOE might have the added benefit of strengthening the diversity and specialisations of NATO armed forces. CCASCOE’s role would be to coordinate national militaries investments in different aspects of green defence and foster synergies, best utilising available resourcing and skills, whilst avoiding duplications.

A huge task ahead

Centres of Excellence and formalised best practice sharing channels are no guarantee of accelerating climate-sensitivities in militaries. However, CCASCOE can offer a central repository for strategic insights of how climate change impacts NATO’s capabilities and the ability of the alliance to respond to them. By being relatively high level on the strategy side, CCASCOE is unlikely to infringe on other, more implementation-orientated COEs, as well as further formalising NATO’s commitment to achieving net-zero by 2050.

In the coming months, the design of the COE will be further refined by Canada and fellow NATO Allies. It will be interesting to see which partners are brought in and what the focus will be of this ‘new kid’ on the climate-security block. Climate threats are only likely to grow, meaning NATO will need all the help it can get.

Call for Submissions: Young Leaders: NATO and Climate Security in my Backyard

By Elsa Barron

Are you a young person concerned about the impacts of climate change on well-being and security in your home community? Is your community pursuing innovative approaches to managing climate risks that increase safety and security for your neighbors? Do you have a message to share with policymakers across NATO nations about the opportunities and challenges your home will face in a warming world? The International Military Council on  Climate and Security (IMCCS) and the U.S. Mission to NATO want to hear your story. We are launching a call for young people to submit short videos showcasing their personal climate security stories. NATO has increased its ambition on climate change over the past few years and your fresh perspectives can help them drive their action even further. 

Selected videos will be featured in a #MyClimateSecurityStory social media campaign showcasing youth experiences with climate security risks across the Arctic, the Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. In addition to being featured on social media, selected individuals will be invited to a Young Leaders’ Climate Security Dialogue with the potential for in-person engagement at a NATO ministerial meeting.

Read the full Call for Submissions and apply here.

REPORT: IMCCS Contributes Chapter on Security to Global Center on Adaptation 2022 Report

By Brigitte Hugh and Elsa Barron

Ahead of the 27th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Global Center on Adaptation released the State and Trends in Africa Report 2022 (STA22) which completes an overview of the present and projected climate risks in Africa and provides a blueprint for adaptation action. 

This year, the chapter on security was provided by the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) Expert Group, co-authored by  Elsa Barron of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and Laura Birkman of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). 

The chapter advocates the need to “climate-proof” security action and “conflict-proof” climate adaptation. This message is underscored through the chapter’s five key messages: 

  1. As a “threat multiplier,” climate change exacerbates fragile situations and worsens social tensions and upheaval. Therefore, countries with fragile socioeconomic and political systems are especially susceptible to the security impacts of climate change.
  2. There can be no adaptation without security, just as there is no security without adaptation. Without effective governance and social and political stability, adaptation projects fall to the wayside, or may even risk exacerbating population vulnerability if they do not consider emergent security risks. 
  3. A range of early-warning systems (EWS) have emerged in the African context, which effectively warn and inform about dimensions of climate and conflict. EWS should rely on local actors and their knowledge in order to prevent maladaptation and to not enhance or exacerbate existing vulnerabilities of local and marginalized communities.
  4. Integrating dialogue into the planning and implementation stages of all adaptation projects is important for addressing community concerns. Otherwise, adaptation projects could create economic or social winners and losers, increasing instability among the local population. Dialogue programs help to avert these missteps toward maladaptation and establish local partnerships that are more resilient to climate and conflict risks.
  5. Regional and local security sectors in Africa have a significant opportunity to engage in climate adaptation and climate-security risk reduction. This is because, in many cases, they may be the only existing or best-equipped force to prepare for and respond to disasters. 

To read the chapter on security, click here. To read the full report click here.

Briefer: Climate Change a “Top Tier Threat” in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy

By Sherri Goodman, Holly Kaufman, and Pauline Baudu

The Biden Administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), released in October 2022, elevates attention and focus on climate security beyond any prior NSS. The security risks of climate change get the attention in the NSS they have long deserved. Climate change is in fact framed as a top-tier threat on a par with geopolitical challenges from U.S. adversaries and competitors.

The NSS states:

“Of all of the shared problems we face, climate change is the greatest and potentially [most] existential for all nations. Without immediate global action during this crucial decade, global temperatures will cross the critical warming threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius after which scientists have warned some of the most catastrophic climate impacts will be irreversible.”

The world is already experiencing deadly and life-altering climate-related catastrophes (e.g, flooding in Pakistan, fires and drought in California, hurricanes in Florida) when the Earth’s global average land and ocean surface temperature has risen at least 1.1 degrees Celsius since the mid-1800s (approximately 2 degrees Fahrenheit). This NSS recognizes the unprecedented risks posed by such disasters. It therefore includes climate risks and related solutions in every aspect of national security and foreign policy, from reduction of carbon pollution to building resilience at home and abroad, and threading climate risks into every regional strategy. In this regard, the new NSS includes many of the recommendations in our Briefer of June 2021,“Climate Change in the U.S. National Security Strategy: History and Recommendations.”

The most recent NSS addresses our five key recommendations as well emerging concerns due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. These are 1) include all sectors, not just energy, including sources and sinks; 2) expand the concept of climate security to ecological security; 3) increase environmental monitoring; 4) forecast and plan for unpredictability; 5) assert strong U.S. leadership on climate and inter-related global ecological concerns, including passing aggressive climate and environmental restoration legislation and appropriating sufficient funding.

This briefer by the Center for Climate and Security focuses on these five recommendations and the relevant provisions within the NSS, concluding that the NSS both succeeds in recognizing the interdependence of all natural systems and resources, but also embodies several contradictions which should be improved. However, “the theme of the 2022 NSS is spot on: ‘No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues like the climate crisis because of bilateral differences.'”

Just and Comprehensive Action on Climate Security in Australia and Beyond: An Interview with Cheryl Durrant

By Elsa Barron

The Australian Security Leaders Climate Group (ASLCG), a partner of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), is working to reframe the climate debate in Australia to address the multifaceted security risks posed by climate change. The group recently released its second report, an Australian Climate and Security Risk Assessment Implementation Proposal. I spoke with Cheryl Durrant, an executive member of the ASLCG and former Director of Preparedness & Mobilization at the Australian Department of Defense, about this report and the path towards just and comprehensive action on climate security risks for Australia and beyond.

Elsa Barron: How did you initially become concerned about the intersection between climate change and security challenges? How did that concern evolve over the course of your career and ultimately lead to the creation of the ASLCG?

Cheryl Durrant: Curiously, I am a military historian and I first understood the relationship between climate and security when I was studying the collapse of middle-American civilizations, which was partly an environmental collapse. That was my start, but I really became aware of the urgency and extremity of the current climate change crisis in 2012 when I commissioned a piece of work from our [The Australian] Defense Science and Technology Group on global change. From all of the global challenges presented in the report, climate change leapt out as different from the others in three ways: pervasiveness, probability, and scale. Climate change was happening everywhere, it was almost certain, and it had the potential to destroy civilizations and cause probable extinction if left unchecked. 

Barron: I’m curious, in addition to your own journey and interest, how have you seen the security community approach the connection between climate change?

Durrant: I think there are two strands to it. One is based on the ground. When we started going out and talking about climate change at international conferences and with other militaries, we constantly heard the same story: that the soldiers have already grasped this concept from the ground up. They are in the same training range every year and the landscape is changing. Soldiers and sailors are some of the most profound supporters of this work because they are in it every day. 

Then there is the second strand which is a more theoretical analysis of climate change as a geopolitical security challenge. This issue poses a dilemma for security professionals because it is a problem that is without boundaries. It doesn’t follow standard geopolitical thinking. You can’t think of it as a traditional enemy, because you contribute to it as well. You can’t fight yourself because you’re putting carbon in the atmosphere. 

Barron: Last year, ASLCG published its inaugural report titled, “Missing in Action: Responding to Australia’s Climate & Security Failure.” What has guided the progression from that report to the release of your most recent, solutions-oriented report, “Australian Climate & Security Risk Assessment?”

Durrant: If you see action on climate change as a campaign, which is a framing we are used to in the military, then the first step of that campaign is to get the government and the people of Australia to connect climate change to security. Then, they can recognize that action is needed and take steps towards that action. The ASLCG has been in the raising awareness step. Now we’ve largely accomplished the goal of that first step: the current government has adopted our policy suggestion of integrating a climate risk assessment. Now, we are in the second phase of the campaign which is moving from awareness to understanding and action.

When I started seriously looking into this problem in 2012, the general thinking was that we weren’t going to see catastrophic climate security impacts until 2100 or later. By 2015, we were concerned that we might see those catastrophic effects by mid-century. Now, we are seeing catastrophic effects for some parts of the planet already – horrific events this summer in Europe, Africa, South Asia, Australia, and North America. The time horizon we have to take action is really very short.

With our most recent report, we are recommending a broad risk assessment because that is a way to engage not only government, but also business, think tanks, and the general community to understand we are in a crisis mode. Unless everyone understands we are in crisis mode, then people aren’t prepared to make the sacrifices that a crisis mode entails. The response to the climate crisis will not be a smooth path, it will be a bumpy path and we need a mindset change to understand how urgent, how large, and how globally interconnected the climate risks that we face really are. 

Barron: ASLCG’s report argues that existential risks must be treated differently in policy-making than standard risks. How does this apply to climate security risks? Are there examples of low-probability yet high-impact risks that should be given more attention?

Durrant: From my perspective, there are probably two major existential risks we should be thinking about and they’re interconnected. Existential risk indicates the possibility of civilization collapse or human extinction. This kind of risk is not really comparable to something like an economic decline of 10 percent; it’s an entirely different scale and you really have to get your head around the gravity of that difference. 

The two risks that I elevate to this level are climate change and nuclear conflict. These carry the potential to cause human extinction or civilization collapse to such an extent that it might never come back again. They’re also connected because climate change escalates the risk of conflict and the fear of nuclear war is putting a break on some of the international cooperation we want to see around climate change. These two risks are now circling and exacerbating each other. There is a whole range of other existential risks like super volcano eruptions or solar events, but humanity has less capacity to control those risks. Let’s focus on the two that we can act on.

Barron: How do you communicate this level of risk? You mentioned that communication is often focused on hope because it is more empowering to people, so how do you really communicate the scale of risk in a way that is effective at galvanizing action?

Durrant: Risk is best communicated through lived experience. I already mentioned the soldier who feels the impacts of climate change in his bones as he’s losing his Christmases because he has to keep responding to fires. The bush that he loves and appreciates because he’s been training in it for 30 years is changing. He doesn’t see the little animals or birds he normally sees. It’s deeply felt and understood. It’s not an intellectual thing, it’s an experience of the heart. 

That’s why in our approach to the integrated risk assessment, we wanted to go further than pure analysis. We won’t change minds through glossy reports, we’ll do it by sitting down face-to-face with people. I see an amazing connection between the ecological security work that the IMCCS is doing and permaculture movements. Call it what you want– ecological security, environmental justice, intergenerational responsibility– but the goals are the same. It’s important to connect these movements together rather than separate them if we want to create change. 

That requires the thinkers and leaders, such as the security leaders, to go humbly amongst the public and have their one-on-one, face-to-face, small group conversation and build the movement from the bottom-up. Ultimately, we need a social tipping point. Yes, physically it is a problem of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But, in terms of the human cause and response, it’s a social movement challenge. Without a social tipping point, I don’t see our action being quick enough or big enough to avert a worsening crisis. 

Barron: The ASLCG report advocates using scenarios methodology for carrying out a risk assessment. In the case of Australia, what parties should be brought into scenario planning to conduct a thorough analysis of climate security?

Durrant: It’s important that scenarios are an immersive experience. In order to create that immersion, I think there are three main groups that are important: security professionals, climate science and sector impact experts (e.g. economy, health, environment, infrastructure), and community and civic groups. I think it’s really important to bring these groups all together. By design, the assessment will help information to flow from the bottom-up. 

These integrated scenarios provide opportunities for creativity, for example, imagining plausible utopias. How do we rethink international security and creatively imagine the rules of a different world? I think this creativity is really important because the right-brained thinkers– the intelligence officers and the security analysts– are very good at dystopias but not very good at utopias. I think bringing the creative arts, storytelling sector, and other strange bedfellows for the security world into the conversation is important for addressing this multifaceted crisis. 

We also need diverse groups to solve diverse planetary problems. The answer to an African problem might be from an Indian solution and the answer to an American problem might come from a Nordic solution and the answer to an Australian problem might come from a Chinese solution, so we can’t afford to not share the solutions. It’s also important to get youth and other groups involved that also come with unique skills and perspectives. 

Barron: I completely agree with your points on diversity and also youth engagement, do you see that as a part of the positive social tipping point we’re working towards?

Durrant: Yes, and it’s people coming with their authentic voices as well. We have a certain paradigm that can be reductionist, patriarchal, and capitalist. There are many assumptions that are deeply embedded in how we think. Women’s voices, Indigenous voices, non-Western voices, and youth voices are not captive in that paradigm. 

Certain rules of thinking tend to run very deep in the security community. Traditionally, security is about a bad guy, whereas the climate crisis doesn’t really have a clearly defined adversary. That means there is a whole body of learning you need to put aside in order to think differently, and it’s a very hard transformation to make. Our mindset for dealing with problems doesn’t often get to the root cause. 

Barron: What is at stake for Australia if it falls behind its allies and partners in getting to those root causes? In contrast, what opportunities exist if Australia steps up its commitment to combating these challenges?

Durrant: I’ll start with the opportunities. Australia can be a leader because, uniquely among the western alliance, it’s very rich in renewable energy resources and also agricultural resources; it’s a net exporter. Even with its major climate vulnerabilities, the biocapacity of the Australian continent to continue to produce food is substantial. When the world starts to get short of food and needs secure access to critical minerals, Australia can be there. Australia also has masses of nuclear, hydrogen, wind, and solar energy so it’s actually really well poised to be a renewable energy superpower. 

Australia has a choice in how to use this power. It can choose to perpetrate great power to control and shape the world in our favor. Or, it can use its force to address social justice concerns and provide resources to those who need them most.  We have to think globally and not just locally and transform the mindset from thinking “oh we’re lucky we don’t have to work too hard”, to thinking “wow, we’re fortunate, we can help others and lead the transition.” Some of that shift is evident in the government’s efforts. They are seeing that they can be a force for good and need to choose that path. 

Read about the ASLCG’s first report, “Missing in Action,” here